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Introduction
There has recently been a revival of interest in the subject of the directors’ duty to
creditors where the company is financially distressed1 and it was considered in some
detail by the Company Law Review Steering Group, which was set up by the
government to review core company law in 19982 and reported in 2001.3 Although the
duty is now generally regarded as well established in principle,4 there are important
aspects of it which remain unclear and the role of the duty in modern law has been
questioned. This paper briefly outlines the development of the duty in Great Britain
before going on to explore the uncertainties surrounding the duty, the treatment of the
duty by the Company Law Review Steering Group, the government’s response, and
the role of the duty in modern British law.
The Development of the Duty in Great Britain
As has been noted elsewhere,5 the development of the duty has been well
documented,6 but a brief outline may usefully be given here.
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The development of the duty in Great Britain builds on Commonwealth authority. The
duty is generally regarded as originating in the famous dictum of Mason J in the
Australian High Court case of Walker v Wimborne7 to the effect that the directors of a
company in discharging their duty to the company are required to take into account
the interests of its shareholders and creditors, any failure to take into account the
interests of creditors having adverse consequences for the company as well as the
creditors themselves.8 The approach in that case was followed in other
Commonwealth cases which have also influenced the development of the law in Great
Britain, most notably the cases of Nicholson v Permakraft9 and Kinsela v Russell
Kinsela Pty Ltd.10
In Great Britain, the first signs of recognition of the duty appeared in the case of
Lohnro Ltd V Shell Petroleum Co Ltd11 where Lord Diplock stated that the best
interests of the company, in which the directors were bound to act, were ‘not
exclusively those of its shareholders but may include those of its creditors’.12 Other
cases followed. In Re Horsley and Weight Ltd,13 Buckley LJ spoke of directors owing
an indirect duty to creditors not to permit any unlawful reduction of capital.14 In
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical
Services Ltd and ors,15 Dillon LJ appeared not to recognise the existence of the duty,
stating clearly that directors owed fiduciary duties to the company but not to the
creditors, present or future.16 In the later case of West Mercia Safety Wear Ltd v
Dodd,17 however, he distinguished Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co on the
basis that in that case, the company had been amply solvent18 and he went on to quote
with approval another famous dictum, that of Street J in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty
Ltd,19 to the effect that where a company is insolvent, the interests of the creditors
intrude and they become prospectively entitled to displace the power of the directors
to deal with the company’s assets because in a practical sense the company’s assets
are their assets.20
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The existence of the duty was also recognised by the House of Lords in Winkworth v
Edward Baron Development Co Ltd,21 the Court of Appeal in Brady v Brady22 and
(indirectly) in Re Welfab Engineers Ltd23 and, more recently, in Yukong Lines of
Korea v Rendsberg Investment Corp of Liberia (No 2),24 Facia Footwear Ltd v
Hinchcliffe,25 Clydebank Football Club Ltd v Steedman and ors,26 Re Pantone 485
Ltd,27 Colin Gwyer and Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd28 and Re
MDA Investment Management Ltd.29
Uncertainties surrounding the duty
Direct or indirect duty?
Perhaps the most important area of uncertainty has been the question of whether the
duty is an independent one owed directly to creditors, with the result that any creditor
can take steps to enforce it against the directors, or whether it is an indirect one owed
to the company to take account of the creditors'interests, with the result that it can
only be enforced by the company.30
The preponderance of authority favours the latter interpretation. In Walker v
Wimborne31 itself, the duty was expressed as one owed to the company32 and this
approach is reflected either expressly or impliedly in all but one of the British cases
referred to above. The exception is Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co
Ltd,33 where Lord Templeman stated that a duty is owed by the directors to the
company and to the creditors of the company to ensure that the company'
s affairs
were properly administered and that its property was not dissipated or exploited for
the benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of creditors.34 This can be
interpreted as implying that there is a specific, separate duty to the creditors.35 As
indicated, however, this is inconsistent with the approach taken in the other British
cases, and indeed the concept of a direct duty to creditors was specifically rejected in
the later case of Yukong Lines of Korea v Rendsberg Investment Corp of Liberia (No
2),36 where Toulson J said that a director does not owe a direct fiduciary duty to an
21
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individual creditor, nor is an individual creditor entitled to sue for breach of the
fiduciary duty owed by the director to the company.37
It should be noted that neither approach is wholly free from difficulty. Potential
problems which have been suggested with formulating the duty as an indirect one
owed to the company include whether the interests of creditors are to be considered
independently or only in so far as they are relevant to the company'
s interests;
whether creditors'interests are part of a "package" of claims including shareholders
and employees and, if so, how any conflicts of interests should be resolved; and
whether directorial consideration of creditors'interests is to be assessed subjectively
or objectively.38 These issues are discussed further below. However, formulating the
duty as a direct one enforceable by individual creditors may be even more
problematic, in spite of some apparent advantages. Thus it has been said that while a
direct duty might appear to have the advantages of rendering the duty more effective
by placing enforcement in the hands of those with the keenest interest in enforcement
and of directing the proceeds of a successful action to the particular creditor taking the
action, in fact it is questionable to what extent these advantages would actually
materialise, and allowing a direct action would invite a multiplicity of actions,
encourage litigation and incur considerable time and expense, all of which would be
lessened if the company were the only possible litigant.39 It has also been said that
allowing a direct action by creditors would create the potential for double recovery,
and that mediating the duty through the company has the advantage of preserving that
important principle of insolvency law, the pari passu principle, by preventing any one
creditor from stealing a march on other creditors as well as preserving the procedural
monopoly of liquidation proceedings for dealing with the claims of creditors against
an insolvent company.40 It has further been said that if one accepts the neo-classical
view of the company as dedicated to profit maximisation, with the directors as agents
of that profit maximisation, a direct duty to creditors cuts across this, and that a direct
duty to creditors does not sit easily alongside the board'
s existing fiduciary duties.41
The question of the nature of a direct duty, i.e. whether it should be regarded as an
extension of the directors'duty of care or as grounded in tortuous principles, has also
been raised.42
Who are the creditors?
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The duty is usually expressed in the most general of terms as a duty to (take account
of the interests of) the creditors, but which creditors? One issue here is whether the
duty is confined to existing creditors or extends to future creditors. Most of the cases
are silent on the matter, but in Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd,43
Lord Templeman clearly included future creditors. In contrast, in Brady v Brady,44
Nourse J confined his formulation of the duty to existing creditors and in Nicholson v
Permakraft,45 Cooke J took the view that future creditors would normally take the
company as it was and could look after their own interests. The latter approach has,
however, been criticised on the basis that, at least once the company has reached the
stage where insolvent liquidation is inevitable, there is little justification for
differentiating between the two groups of creditors.46
The issue is important because the interests of present and future creditors may
conflict.47 So too may the interests of existing creditors: a number of commentators
have pointed out that creditors are not a homogenous group and may have conflicting
interests and that there is little guidance for directors who have to choose between
competing interests.48 Some further guidance can now be found in the recent decision
in Re Pantone 485 Ltd,49 where Richard Field QC stated that the creditors meant the
creditors as a whole, i.e. the general creditors, and that if the directors acted
consistently with the interests of the general creditors but inconsistently with the
interest of a creditor or section of creditors with special rights in a winding up, they
would not be in breach of their duty to the company.50 This still leaves a number of
questions unanswered, however, for example what precisely is meant by '
general
creditors'and '
creditors with special rights in a winding up'
.
Which creditors should benefit from any such duty? Finch has argued that the duty
should be construed as being owed to the unsecured creditors as a class, and that this
would give meaningful guidance to directors without being prejudicial to secured
creditors who would still be able to take steps to enforce their security.51 Re Pantone
485 Ltd52 may have this result if '
general creditors'can be regarded as unsecured
creditors and '
creditors with special rights in an insolvency'(whose interests must give
way to the interests of the general creditors) can be regarded as including secured
43
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creditors, but this is not entirely clear. A more sophisticated formulation suggested by
Lipson is that the duty should be owed only to those creditors with low levels of
volition, cognition and exit, namely tort creditors, certain terminated employees,
taxing authorities and certain trade creditors.53 As he himself acknowledges, however,
such an approach has a number of implications which may require further
consideration. Whatever approach is taken, however, it is arguable that some
distinction must be made in order to ensure that the duty is capable of operating
effectively.54
Are creditors' interests entitled to exclusive consideration?
There is a lack of consistency in the case law as to whether the directors must
consider the interests of creditors exclusively when the duty arises or whether, and to
what extent, they can take other interests into account. The question of when the duty
arises is considered in more detail below, but it requires to be mentioned briefly here
because the circumstances in which the duty arises are relevant to assessing the
weight to be given to creditors'interests at that point and this is also discussed further
below. At this point, it should suffice to say that the duty is generally regarded as
arising when the company is either insolvent or in some degree of financial distress or
where a proposed course of action is likely to render the company insolvent.
Some of the cases are silent or ambiguous on this issue, while others are clearer but
point in contrary directions. In Brady v Brady,55 for example, Nourse J said that where
the company is insolvent or even doubtfully solvent, the interests of the company are
in reality the interests of existing creditors alone. This clearly suggests an exclusive
focus on creditor interests. Finch suggests that such an approach is consistent with the
approach of Street J in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd,56 referred to above, to the
effect that where a company is insolvent, it is in a practical sense the creditors'assets
which are being managed by the directors.57 However, it is suggested that the
comments of Street J are not in fact entirely unambiguous in this respect; as noted
above, these comments were approved, without elaboration, by Dillon LJ in West
Mercia Safety Wear Ltd v Dodd,58 but the latter case has been cited in subsequent
cases as authority both for the proposition that the creditors'interests become
paramount in an insolvency situation59 and for the proposition that the creditors'
interests in an insolvency situation require to be taken into account in addition to the
interests of shareholders.60 In Re Pantone 485 Ltd,61 Richard Field QC also said that it
was firmly established that when a company becomes insolvent, the directors must act
in the interests of its creditors and not its shareholders, again suggesting an exclusive
53
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focus on creditor interests, and cited as authority for this proposition Re Horsley and
Weight Ltd,62 but it is doubtful whether the latter case can be said to support such a
sweeping statement. The statement of Nourse J in Brady v Brady63 is clear and
unambiguous, but it is the only such clear and unambiguous statement to be found in
the British authorities.
In contrast, many of the other cases which touch on the matter seem to favour an
approach where creditors' interests are considered alongside other interests,
particularly the interests of the shareholders. Thus in Walker v Wimborne64 itself,
Mason J spoke of the need for directors to take into account the interests of
shareholders and creditors, although he did not limit the duty to cases of insolvency or
financial distress. In Nicholson v Permakraft,65 Cooke J spoke of the need for the
directors on the facts of particular cases to consider, inter alia, the interests of
creditors and said that in his opinion, creditors were entitled to consideration in what
is here described loosely as various circumstances related to insolvency.66 There is
nothing to suggest, however, that creditors'interests should be considered exclusively
in those circumstances. In Lohnro Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd,67 as noted above,
Lord Diplock stated that the best interests of the company, in which the directors were
bound to act, were not exclusively those of the shareholders but might include those
of its creditors, thus clearly requiring the directors to take account of both, although
again the duty was not limited to cases of insolvency or financial distress. In both
Clydebank Football Club Ltd v Steedman and ors68 and Re MDA Investment
Management Ltd,69 the matter was approached on the basis that the interests of
creditors had to be taken into account as well as the interests of shareholders where
the company was insolvent or in financial difficulty. Finally, it should be noted that in
Re Welfab Engineers Ltd,70 Hoffmann J (as he was then) held that the directors were
entitled to take into account, inter alia, the interests of employees when considering
various offers for the company'
s business although they were not entitled to sell the
business to save their jobs and those of the other employees of the company on terms
which would clearly leave the creditors in a worse position than on liquidation.
Finch suggests that a way to resolve the tensions in this area is to read the dicta in
Brady v Brady71 and Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd72 as being concerned with the
reorientation of focus from shareholder to creditor interests occurring around the point
of insolvency rather than as concerned with the issue of exclusivity of interests and
for the courts to stress that while creditor interests do fall to be considered on
insolvency or financial distress, they do not have to be the exclusive concern of
directors, in the same way as directors are entitled to look beyond shareholder
62
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interests before insolvency.73 Such an inclusive approach would sit well with the
recent emphasis in Great Britain on a more inclusive approach to the concept of the
company generally,74 but as noted above in relation to creditors with conflicting
interests, there are problems with an approach which requires directors to consider
conflicting interests.75
Is the test subjective or objective?
As noted above, one of the problems identified with regarding the duty as one owed to
the company is whether directorial consideration of creditors'interests is to be
assessed subjectively or objectively.76 The answer to this question is uncertain.77
Finch points out that a subjective approach would be consistent with principle but
poses problems of accountability while an objective approach could draw the courts
into an assessment of directors'business decisions.78 This issue is discussed further
below in the context of assessing the directors'knowledge of the circumstances which
trigger the duty.
When does the duty arise?
Another important area of uncertainty is precisely when the duty arises. Some of the
early cases, including Walker v Wimborne79 itself, Lohnro Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co
Ltd80 and Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd81 do not make any
reference to a requirement for the company to be insolvent or in financial distress in
order for the duty to arise. However, in another of the early cases, Re Horsley and
Weight Ltd,82 Templeman LJ (as he was then) said that misfeasance on the part of the
directors would have been established if the company had been '
doubtfully solvent'at
the relevant time and the later cases have generally conditioned the existence of the
duty on the company'
s insolvency or certain circumstances short of insolvency. Thus
while insolvency or certain circumstances short of insolvency now seems to be an
accepted requirement for the duty to arise, uncertainty remains over the precise point
at which it does so because of the different terminology used by the judges.
Thus, in West Mercia Safety Wear Ltd v Dodd,83 as noted above, Dillon LJ contrasted
the position in the earlier case of Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd and ors84 where the company was
'
amply solvent'with the position in the instant case where the company was '
insolvent'
and quoted with approval the dictum of Street J in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd85
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to the effect that the duty arises where a company is insolvent.86 In Brady v Brady,87
as noted above, Nourse J said that the interests of the company were in reality the
interests of existing creditors alone where the company was '
insolvent, or even
doubtfully solvent'
. In that case, the company in fact remained solvent following the
transaction which was said to give rise to the breach of duty, but Nourse J went on to
say that the proportion of assets being removed from the company (one half) required
the directors to ask themselves whether the remaining half would be sufficient to
discharge the company'
s existing debts, which implies that directors are also required
to consider the interests of creditors where the company is solvent but a transaction
potentially affects that solvency. This echoes the approach taken in Nicholson v
Permakraft,88 where Cooke J said that in his opinion, creditors were entitled to
consideration when the company was '
insolvent, or near insolvent, or of doubtful
solvency, or if a contemplated payment or other cause of action would jeopardise its
solvency'
.89 In Facia Footwear Ltd v Hinchcliffe,90 Sir Richard Scott V-C, having
quoted the familiar passages from Walker v Wimborne,91 Nicholson v
Permakraft92and Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd,93 went on to say that the duty
arose in the instant case since the company and the whole group of which it was part
were in '
a very dangerous financial position'
. In Colin Gwyer and Associates Ltd v
London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd,94 the duty was expressed as arising where the
company was '
insolvent or of doubtful solvency or on the verge of insolvency and it is
95
the creditors'money which is at risk'
while in Re MDA Investment Management
Ltd,96 Park J said that the duty arose where the company '
whether technically
insolvent or not, is in financial difficulties to the extent that its creditors are at risk'
.97
It is clear from these dicta that '
insolvency'will trigger the duty and most of the cases
contemplate that the duty will also be triggered in certain circumstances short of
insolvency. It is, however, difficult to identify with precision what such circumstances
are and even the concept of insolvency itself as a trigger for the duty is not
unproblematic. Insolvency is not a term of art and may be used to mean different
things, for example, balance sheet insolvency (where liabilities exceed assets),
practical/liquidity insolvency (where the company is unable to pay its debts as they
fall due).98 None of the British cases, however, attempts to define what is meant by
insolvency in this context and the vagueness of the concept as a basis for directors'
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duty has been criticised.99 It has also been pointed out that there can be real practical
difficulties in identifying the point at which a company has become insolvent,
irrespective of which test is used,100 and it is not clear whether the directors'
knowledge of the insolvency is to be judged objectively or subjectively.101
Furthermore, it has been said that the point at which the company becomes insolvent
is too late for the duty to creditors to arise.102 To focus on problems with the concept
of insolvency as a trigger for the duty, however, may be to miss the point. Grantham
points out that insolvency is simply the most obvious indicator of the fact that the
residual risk is no longer borne by the shareholders and thus the question to be asked
by the court is not simply whether the company is insolvent but, given the distribution
of risk, whether it is still appropriate to regard the interests of the shareholders as
exclusively reflecting the corporate interest.103 In other words, the critical issue is not
the company'
s solvency or insolvency as such, but whether the circumstances are such
as to put the creditors'interests at risk so that a shift in directors'duties to taking
creditors'interests into account (exclusively or otherwise104) is justified. Such an
approach is consistent with the requirement in Nicholson v Permakraft105 and Brady v
Brady106 that creditors'interests be considered even where the company is solvent if a
contemplated payment or other action would jeopardise that solvency and is clearly
reflected in dicta such as those in Colin Gwyer and Associates Ltd v London Wharf
(Limehouse) Ltd107 and Re MDA Investment Management Ltd108 referred to above,
which focus on the risk to the creditors.
Keay has suggested that the most appropriate formula for the trigger for the duty
would be where the circumstances of the company are such that that its directors
know, or can reasonably expect, that the action upon which they are going to embark
could lead to the insolvency of the company.109 This test is an objective one and he
argues that if such a formulation were adopted, the court would require to take into
account the particular circumstances in each case so that the more obvious it is that
the creditors'money is at risk, the lower the risk to which the directors'are justified in
exposing the company.110 The Company Law Review Steering Group, in formulating
a possible statutory version of the duty, provided for it to arise when a director knows,
or would know but for a failure of his to exercise due care and skill, that it is more
likely than not that the company will at some point be unable to pay its debts as they
99
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fall due. The proposals of the Company Law Review Steering Group are discussed in
more detail below, but it may be noted that this test is also an objective one and it
includes a definition of insolvency. Both of these formulations continue to link the
duty to the concept of insolvency. In view of the previous discussion, however, it may
be that a formula which instead refers to the risk to (relevant) creditors'interests
would reflect the real focus of the duty more clearly, for example where the directors
know or ought to have known that their conduct would put the (relevant) creditors'
interests at risk.
The Company Law Review
As noted above, the Company Law Review Steering Group was set up by the
government to review core company law in 1998111 and reported in 2001.112 Directors'
duties was one of the main areas considered by the review. At the time the Company
Law Review Steering Group was set up, the issue of regulating directors'conflicts of
interests and formulating a statement of directors' duties was already under
consideration by the Law Commissions,113 but it was intended that the Company Law
Review would look at the wider issue of whether the directors'duty to act in the
interests of their companies should be interpreted as meaning simply that they should
act in the interests of the shareholders or whether they should take account of other
interests, such as those of employees, creditors, customers, the environment and the
wider community.114
The Company Law Review Steering Group published its first consultation document
by in February 1999.115 This considered directors'duties as part of the wider issue of
the proper scope of company law i.e. in whose interests companies should be run. It
noted that under the current legal framework, companies are formed and managed for
the benefit of shareholders but subject to safeguards for the benefit of actual and
prospective creditors.116 It also noted that directors are obliged by their fiduciary
duties to manage the business on behalf of the shareholders honestly, in their best
judgement, for the benefit of the company, which normally means for the benefit of
the shareholders as a whole,117 but that there is an overriding obligation to ensure that
creditors are not wrongfully exposed to insolvency through the general duties
imposed by company law (citing West Mercia Safety Wear Ltd v Dodd118) and
insolvency law and the special safeguards which apply to protect creditors in
particular transactions such as distributions of profits or capital.119
The first consultation document considered two main approaches to the question of
the proper scope of company law: the '
enlightened shareholder value'approach, which
regards the interests of the company as the interests of the shareholders but recognises
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that promoting the interests of the shareholders will involve giving appropriate
consideration to other interests, and the '
pluralist'approach, which seeks to redefine
the interests of the company in such a way that that concept encompasses a number of
different interests, not just shareholders. It recognised that each of these approaches
would require a different formulation of directors'duties and sought views on various
possible options.120 It did not mention further, however, the directors'duty to creditors
where the company is financially distressed.
Later that year, the Law Commissions published their Report on Regulating Conflicts
Of Interests And Formulating A Statement Of Duties.121 They recommended, inter
alia, a partial codification of the law on directors'duties and produced a draft
statutory statement of the main duties owed by a director to his company. The draft
statement encompassed the main fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill but
stressed that it was not a complete statement of a director'
s duties. The directors'duty
to creditors where the company is financially distressed was not included in the draft
statement, although its existence had been noted in the joint consultation paper.122
The Company Law Review Steering Group published a further consultation document
in March 2000.123 This effectively adopted the enlightened shareholder value
approach to company law which had been favoured by the majority of consultees.124
So far as directors'duties were concerned, the consultation document proposed, inter
alia, to introduce a statutory statement of principles covering all directors'general
duties which would include a requirement for directors to achieve the success of the
company for the benefit of the shareholders by taking proper account of all relevant
considerations for that purpose125 and included a trial draft statutory statement.126 The
first principle in the trial draft set out what it described as the directors'duty of
compliance and loyalty. It required a director to exercise his powers honestly and for
their proper purpose and in accordance with the company'
s constitution and decisions
taken lawfully under it and, subject to that requirement, to exercise his powers in the
way he believes in good faith is best calculated in the circumstances, taking account
of both the short and the long term consequences of his acts, to promote the success of
the company for the benefits of its members as a whole. It went on to state that the
circumstances to which the director is to have regard for that purpose include, in
particular, so far as his duty of skill and care may require, the company'
s need to
foster its business relationships, including those with its employees and suppliers and
customers; the impact of its operations on the environment; and its need to maintain a
reputation for high standards of business conduct.
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The commentary on the trial draft stated that it was intended to retain the current
relationship between the general duties of directors and the rest of the law which
meant, for example, that insolvency law and the liabilities of directors for misfeasance
in an insolvent winding up would be retained in their present overriding form.127
Consideration was given to the inclusion of an additional principle specifically
requiring directors '
to consider foremost the interests of creditors in circumstances
where the company is insolvent or threatened by insolvency'
.128 It was said that while
a number of British and Commonwealth cases suggested that such a principle existed
(giving as examples Nicholson v Permakraft129 and West Mercia Safety Wear Ltd v
in reality the cases seem capable of resolution on the basis of other
Dodd130), '
131
principles and have been strongly criticised on these grounds.'
It was also said that
creditors should have a remedy in a winding up or on the basis of their contracts and
that the prospect of personal liability under insolvency law should have a deterrent
effect on directors when a company is threatened with insolvency.132 It was said
further that creditors'interests were already properly included within the inclusive
loyalty principle133 and that enactment of an additional principle would cut across
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 which enables the liquidator in an insolvent
winding up to recover a contribution from a director who failed to take the necessary
action to protect creditors where insolvency was inevitable, a separate and detailed
overriding provision which there was no reason to change.134 The inclusion of the
additional principle in the statement was therefore rejected.135 It was thought,
however, that the position with respect to ratification might be different,136 and views
were sought on whether a specific provision, effectively preserving the current law,
should be enacted to the effect that misfeasance by directors cannot lawfully be
ratified if it takes place when solvency is in doubt and the effect would be to deprive
creditors of relief in an insolvent winding up.137 Views were also sought on whether it
would be appropriate to include in Form 288 (consent to act as a director) a separate
warning that special principles become relevant where a company is threatened by
insolvency.138 What '
special principles'were meant was not specified and it was not
therefore clear whether this was a reference (only) to insolvency law principles such
as those contained in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 or included the common
law duty to creditors; it was not entirely clear whether that duty was intended to
survive notwithstanding the decision not to include it in the statement of duties.
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The next consultation document, published in November 2000,139 dealt with the duty
to creditors only very briefly. It said:140
It is generally agreed that the duties [contained in the statement] must be subject to
the overriding duties of directors towards creditors in an insolvency situation, but also
that it is undesirable to lay down any detailed new rule in this area; the law is
developing and there is already a carefully balanced statutory provision, which
operates ex post in a liquidation, in the Insolvency Act 1986 section 214 (wrongful
trading). We propose that this issue should be dealt with in a general provision in the
statement making it clear that the duties operate subject to the other provisions of the
Act and to the supervening obligations to have regard to the interests of creditors
when the company is insolvent or threatened by insolvency.

When the final report of the Company Law Steering Group was published in 2001,141
however, the revised statement of directors'duties which it contained did include
provisions on the duties of directors to have regard to the interests of creditors where
there is a risk of insolvency and the reasons for this were explained in some detail.142
It was said that it was important to draw to the attention of directors the fact that
different factors might need to be taken into consideration where the company is
insolvent or threatened by insolvency and to fail to do so would risk misleading
directors by omitting an important part of the overall picture.143 It was also said that it
was felt the earlier technical problems and concerns about including the duty could be
resolved.144
The key issue for the Company Law Steering Group was when the normal rule that a
company should be run in the interests of its shareholders should be modified by an
obligation to have regard also to the interests of creditors or, in an extreme case, an
obligation to override the interests of shareholders entirely.145 It observed that there is
always some risk that insolvency may occur unexpectedly, but as insolvency becomes
more imminent, the normal synergy between the interests of members and creditors
progressively disappears and as the margin of assets reduces, so does the incentive on
directors to avoid risky strategies which endanger the assets.146 It noted that the
present law provided two solutions to this problem. The first solution was section 214
of the Insolvency Act 1986, in terms of which the directors are liable to make a
contribution towards the company'
s assets in an insolvent liquidation where they
knew or ought to have known that the company had no reasonable prospect of
avoiding insolvent liquidation and failed to take all reasonable steps to minimise the
loss to creditors.147 It was proposed that this rule should be included in the statement
of directors'duties in order to make clear the point at which the normal duty of loyalty
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is displaced148 and an appropriate provision was included in the statement of directors'
duties included in the report.
The second solution was the duty to take into account the interests of creditors at an
earlier stage in the onset of insolvency recognised in case law.149 The Company Law
Steering Group suggested that this principle would require directors, where they knew
or ought to recognise that there was a substantial probability of an insolvent
liquidation, to take such steps as they believed, in good faith, appropriate to reduce
the risk, without undue caution and thus continuing also to have in mind the interests
of members.150 It added that the greater the risk of insolvency in terms of probability
and extent, the more directors should take account of creditors'needs and the less
those of members; at the point where there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding
insolvent liquidation, the interests of creditors would become overriding under the
first (section 214) test.151 Leaving aside the question of whether that is what the duty
as currently formulated would in fact require, the Company Law Review Steering
Group thought that such a rule might be regarded as of considerable merit, at least in
principle,152 and it considered what it saw as the arguments for and against such a
rule. In favour of the rule was the argument that without it, directors would apparently
be bound to act in the ultimate interests of members until all reasonable prospect of
avoiding shipwreck had been lost but, where insolvency was less than inevitable yet
the risk was substantial, directors should consider the interests of creditors and
members together.153 Against it was the argument that it might a '
chilling effect'and
the risk that the directors might run down or abandon a going concern at the first hint
of insolvency.154 It was recognised that the balanced judgement the rule would require
was a difficult and indeterminate one and that fear of personal liability might lead to
excessive caution.155 It was said that the fact that case law already imposed such a
duty was not a sufficient reason for retaining it if it would lead to the failure of viable
businesses.156 It was thought, however, that the concerns could at least to some extent
be met by careful drafting, by making the judgement required subject to a subjective
rather than an objective test and by providing, as already mentioned above, that the
duty would only arise when the directors ought in the exercise of due care and skill to
recognise that a failure to meet the company'
s liabilities is more probable than not.157
It was also noted that where the business is threatened with insolvency, there are
procedures short of liquidation open to directors which both provide protection for
creditors and preserve the business.158 The Company Law Steering Group were,
however, split on whether (a version of) the common law rule should be included in
the statement of directors'duties.159 Those against the inclusion of the rule felt that
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even with careful drafting, there would not be adequate guidance for directors and
liability would depend on their being able to discern an intermediate stage on the path
to insolvency which is not identifiable in reality.160 A draft provision was included in
the statement of directors'duties to reflect the views of those members who thought it
should be included, and it was recommended that further consultation should take
place.161
It is worth setting out that draft provision in full:
At a time when a director of a company knows, or would know but for a failure of his
to exercise due care and skill, that it is more likely than not that the company will at
some point be unable to pay its debts as they fall due(a) the duty under paragraph 2 does not apply to him; and
(b) he must, in the exercise of his powers, take such steps (excluding
anything which would breach his duty under paragraph 1 or 5) as he
believes will achieve a reasonable balance between-

Notes

(i) reducing the risk that the company will be unable to pay its
debts as they fall due; and
(ii) promoting the success of the company for the benefit
of its members as a whole
(1) What is a reasonable balance between those things at any time must be
decided in good faith by the director, but he must give more or less weight
to the need to reduce the risk according as the risk is more or less severe.
(2) In deciding in any case what would be most likely to promote the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, the director
must take into account in good faith all the material factors that it is
practicable in the circumstances for him to identify
(3) The notes to paragraph 2 also apply also for the purposes of this
paragraph
(4) In this paragraph, "due care and skill" means the care, skill and diligence
required by paragraph 4.

(The duty under paragraph 2 is a revised duty to promote the company'
s interests for
the benefit of its members as a whole, while the duties under paragraphs 1 and 5 are a
revised duty to obey the constitution and other lawful decisions and a revised rule on
conflicts of interests respectively; the revised duties under paragraphs 1 and 2 and the
notes to paragraph 2 are derived from the composite first principle in the trial draft
contained in the March 2000 consultation paper discussed above. The statement of
duties was subject to revision throughout the consultation process.)
The draft provision certainly addressed many of the uncertainties in the present law,
although there might be differing views on whether the ways in which it did so were
appropriate. Thus, it provided that the duty is owed to the company and thereby
addressed any remaining uncertainty regarding this in the present law. It provided for
the duty to apply when it is more likely than not that the company will at some point
160
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be unable to pay its debts, a concept which is defined in the Insolvency Act 1986162
and includes both balance sheet and practical/liquidity insolvency, and thus addressed
the uncertainty as to the point at which the duty arises in the present law, although the
practical problems in identifying that the relevant point has in fact been reached will,
as concerned those arguing against the duty, remain. It provided that the test for
identifying whether the relevant point has been reached is an objective one while the
test for complying with the duty itself is subjective and thus addressed the
uncertainties as to these issues in the present law. It provided for creditors'interests to
be considered alongside the interests of the shareholders and any other relevant
interests, with more weight being given to creditors'interests as the risk of insolvency
increases up to the point where the creditors'interests become overriding as a result of
the duty under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, and thus addressed at least
partially the uncertainty as to the extent to which creditors'interests are to be taken
into account and the relative weight to be given to the respective interests in the
present law, although problems of conflict could remain in practice. It did not,
however, address the need to specify which creditors should benefit from the duty or
give guidance on the issue of conflicting creditor interests, a serious omission.
The government's response
The government has, however, decided not to include either the proposed provision
based on section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 or the draft provision based on the
common law duty in the statement of directors'duties which is to be included in the
forthcoming legislation. In the White Paper Modernising Company Law issued in July
2002,163 it was stated that the government had carefully considered both suggestions
but had concluded that the weight of argument was against the inclusion of any duties
relating to creditors in the statutory statement.
In relation to the proposed provision based on section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986,
it was said that it would de-couple the obligations imposed under the section from the
remedies available under it, it would unhelpfully conflate company and insolvency
law and it is only one of many duties and obligations owed by directors apart from
company law which it would be inappropriate to single out for inclusion in the
statutory statement of duties.164 It is suggested that the government'
s reasoning on this
point is sound and that there is no need to repeat a duty arising under insolvency law
in the general statement of directors'duties.
In relation to the draft provision based on the common law duty, it was said that the
arguments against the retention of this provision had been outlined by the Review
itself and that the need for directors to make a finely balanced judgement together
with the fact that fears of personal liability might lead to excessive caution would run
counter to the rescue culture which the government was seeking to promote.165 As has
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been pointed out elsewhere,166 the government'
s reasoning here is perhaps less sound.
Firstly, Keay argues that directors might equally well be cautious as a result of their
fear of being held liable for wrongful trading under section 214 of the Insolvency Act
1986 itself,167 although of course under that provision the duty only arises at a later
stage.168 Secondly, since it is widely accepted that the earlier a rescue process is
commenced the more chance there is that it will be successful to the benefit of all
concerned, if the duty to consider creditors at an earlier stage had the effect, as it
arguably could, of causing the directors to take earlier action to institute a rescue
process in appropriate cases, this would in fact benefit rather than run counter to the
rescue culture.169
The White Paper did offer an alternative approach to the question of creditors, which
was to include mention of them, possibly by reference to the company'
s obligations to
them, among the factors to which directors must have regard, where appropriate, in
complying with the revised duty to promote the company'
s interests for the benefit of
170
its members as a whole. It was recognised, however, that this would not achieve the
effect which the draft provision was intended to achieve.171
The explanatory notes accompanying the statement of directors' duties in the
Company Law Steering Group'
s final report made it clear that if the draft provision
was not adopted in some form, consideration would need to be given to whether the
common law principle should be repealed or left to develop, which would leave the
statement of directors'duties incomplete, although there would be the possibility of
including a suitable warning for directors in that event. As noted, the White Paper
rejected the draft provision, but it did not specifically address what should be done
about the existing common law. However, the draft of the Company Law Reform Bill
which is due to be introduced into Parliament shortly makes it clear that the common
law will survive. In setting out the (further refined) duty to promote the success of the
company for the benefit of its members, a provision has been added stating that that
duty is subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.172 The
explanatory material accompanying the draft states that the new provision
recognises that the normal rule that a company is to be run for the benefit of its
members as a whole may need to be modified where the company is insolvent or
threatened by insolvency. In doing so, it preserves the current legal position that,
when the company is insolvent or is nearing insolvency, the interests of the members
should be supplemented or even replaced, by those of its members.

The common law will thus be left to develop as opportunity permits. This may permit
more flexibility in developing the duty than a statutory provision would have
provided, but it is suggested that since the duty is to be retained, a specific provision
in the legislation, providing it was carefully thought through and drafted, would have
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been more satisfactory since it could have resolved at least some of the present
uncertainties surrounding the duty, uncertainties which will now have to await
clarification by the courts as and when the opportunity arises. However, at least the
inclusion of the provision referred to above will draw directors'attention to the fact
that they have the duty even if they cannot determine its content with any certainty.
The role of the duty in modern British law
It thus appears that the directors'duty to creditors will remain part of British law. It
may be asked, however, whether it has a real role to play.
A role for the duty has been emphatically refuted by Sealy,173 who has said that the
law already gives the courts ample scope to deal with all potential abuses of trust by
company directors and even if that had not been so prior to 1986, the (then) new
wrongful trading provision in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 would allow for
developments on a statutory footing which were properly integrated with insolvency
law as a whole.174 Other commentators, however, have pointed out that this may not
in fact be correct and that the duty does have a role to play in supplementing other
provisions for the protection of creditors'interests.175
There are a variety of provisions for the protection of creditors'interests built into
both company and insolvency law, but this paper will concentrate on the main
protections to be found in insolvency law since it is with those provisions that there is
most likely to be a potential overlap where the directors are in breach of their duty to
take account of creditors'interests where the company is in financial distress.176
There are a number of relevant insolvency law provisions in both Scotland and
England and Wales, some of which are common to both jurisdictions and others
which apply only in one or the other. The relevant provisions in England and Wales
have recently been considered in detail in this context by Keay,177 who identifies the
most important provisions in this context as the wrongful trading provision in section
214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the provisions on preferences and transactions at an
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undervalue in sections 239 and 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986 respectively, the
provision on transactions defrauding creditors in section 423 of the Insolvency Act
1986, the fraudulent trading provision in section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and
the misfeasance provision (as it is commonly known) in section 212 of the Insolvency
Act 1986.178 Of these, sections 212, 213 and 214 also apply in Scotland while sections
238, 239 and 423 do not. There are, however, broadly equivalent provisions to section
238 and 239 in Scotland in the form of the statutory provisions on gratuitous
alienations and unfair preferences in sections 242 and 243 of the Insolvency Act 1986
respectively and there are also common law provisions for challenging gratuitous
alienations and unfair preferences. There is no direct equivalent of section 423 of the
Insolvency Act 1986 in Scotland.
Also relevant are the provisions of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986
which makes provision for the disqualification of directors and certain other persons.
Unlike the other provisions referred to, however, this Act is not concerned with
providing a remedy for creditors as such, although it does make provision for personal
liability where a person has acted in breach of a disqualification. It does, however,
enhance creditor protection by removing from the system directors whose conduct
falls short of the appropriate standards and by discouraging such conduct in serving
directors for fear of disqualification. Considerations of space preclude discussion of
disqualification here, but it may be mentioned that trading while insolvent, where a
director causes or permits a company to trade where he knows or ought to know that
there is no reasonable prospect of creditors being paid, will generally result in
disqualification for unfitness under section 6 of the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 on the basis that he has thereby breached his duties to the
company even where such conduct would fall short of giving rise to liability for
wrongful trading under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986.179
Turning back to the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, it seems appropriate to
start with the wrongful trading provision in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986
since it is this section which has sometimes been said to preclude the need for any
duty to creditors at common law180 and it has already been referred to above. The
section applies where a company has gone into insolvent liquidation and provides that
where a director (or former director) knew or ought to have known at some time
before the commencement of the liquidation that the company had no reasonable
prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, he is liable to make such contribution (if
any) to the company'
s assets as the court thinks proper. There is a defence where the
director took every step which he ought to have taken with a view to minimising the
loss to creditors. The director'
s conduct is assessed by a dual objective/subjective test
which assumes that the director has the general knowledge, skill and experience that
may reasonably expected of a person carrying out the director'
s functions and the
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general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. Although Sealy has said
that the section covers the same ground as the duty to creditors,181 in fact this is not
the case. In particular, as was discussed by the Company Law Review Steering
Group,182 the common law duty arises at an earlier stage than the duty under section
214. In addition, section 214 is only available on insolvent liquidation, whereas a
breach of duty, although perhaps most likely to be pursued on liquidation, can be
pursued outside it, for example by an administrator or receiver. Furthermore, as the
case law on section 214 has developed, a number of practical problems with bringing
actions under the section have been identified.183 It may be noted in passing that not
all of these problems would necessarily arise in a Scottish context. Nonetheless, it is
suggested that Keay'
s conclusions that section 214 has not lived up to its early
promise and that there may be cases where a wrongful trading action would fall short
but an action for breach of duty could succeed are justified.184
Similar points can be made in relation to the provisions on preferences and
transactions at an undervalue in sections 239 and 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986
respectively. Section 239 applies on liquidation and administration, and provides that
where a company has, at the relevant time, given a preference to any other person, the
court shall make such order as it thinks fit for restoring the position to what it would
have been if the preference had not been given. A preference is given where the
company does anything which puts a creditor in a better position than he would have
been on an insolvent liquidation and the company was influenced by a desire to put
the creditor in that better position. The preference must have been given within the six
months prior to liquidation or administration, unless it was given to a connected
person in which case the time limit is 2 years, and the company must have been
insolvent at the time of the preference or rendered insolvent as a result of it. Section
238 also applies on liquidation and administration, and provides that where a
company has, at the relevant time, entered into a transaction at an undervalue, the
court shall make such order as it thinks fit for restoring the position to what it would
have been if the company had not entered into the transaction. There is a defence
where the transaction was entered into in good faith for the purpose of carrying on the
company'
s business and at the time it was entered into there were reasonable grounds
for believing that the transaction would benefit the company. The transaction must
have taken place within two years prior to liquidation or administration and again the
company must have been insolvent at the time of the transaction or rendered insolvent
as a result of it, although this is presumed in the case of a transaction with a connected
person. Unlike section 214, sections 239 and 238 are available on administration as
well as liquidation but, as already noted, a breach of duty can be pursued outside these
processes. Furthermore, again a number of practical problems with bringing actions
under these sections have been identified.185 Again it may be noted in passing that not
all of these problems would necessarily arise in a Scottish context, mainly because the
equivalent provisions are different in a number of respects which are important in this
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context.186 Nonetheless, it is suggested that Keay'
s conclusion that a breach of duty
action might be possible where an action under these provisions is not, for example
where the person against whom the proceedings would fall to be brought is
impecunious but the directors are not, is again justified.187
The provision on transactions defrauding creditors in section 423 of the Insolvency
Act 1986 is much broader in scope than the other avoidance provisions in a number of
respects: it is not confined to insolvency, there are no time limits and an action may
be brought by any creditor. However, it relates only to transactions at an undervalue
and it must be established that the person entering the transaction entered it for the
purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of an actual or potential creditor or
otherwise prejudicing such a person. Establishing this last requirement in particular
has been identified as a problem with this provision which would not occur in the
context of an action for breach of duty.188
The fraudulent trading provision in section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 applies
only on liquidation and provides that where any of the company'
s business has been
carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or of any other person or
for any fraudulent purpose, any person who was knowingly a party to the fraudulent
trading is liable to make such contribution (if any) to the company'
s assets as the court
thinks proper. As with section 214, section 213 is only available on insolvent
liquidation, whereas a breach of duty, although perhaps most likely to be pursued on
liquidation, can be pursued outside it. Furthermore, as with the other sections
considered, there are well-known difficulties with the section and a number of
practical problems with bringing actions under it.189 Again, it may be noted in passing
that not all of the practical problems would necessarily arise in a Scottish context,190
but once again it is suggested that Keay'
s conclusion that a liquidator would where
possible seek to bring any action under a different provision is justified.191
The misfeasance provision in section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 applies on
liquidation. Unlike the other provisions discussed here, it does not create any
substantive rights but provides a procedural mechanism for enforcing an existing
claim, including a claim for breach of duty. It is available where a director has
misapplied or retained, or become accountable for, any money or other property of the
company or has been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other
duty in relation to the company. The successful action for breach of duty in West
Mercia Safety Wear Ltd v Dodd192 was brought under this section.
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Having reviewed these provisions, Keay concludes, rightly, that there are deficiencies
and weaknesses in all of them193 and that if there were no breach of duty claim, there
would have been (and will be) cases where liquidators would not have succeeded and
creditors would have been prejudiced.194 He concludes further that while legislative
provisions such as section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 mean that the ambit of the
duty does not have to be as broad as was once thought, it is not irrelevant and has not
been relegated to a "bit part";195 in other words, the duty still has an important role to
play. This presupposes, of course, that creditors are deserving of the (additional)
protection which the duty brings. That, however, is a whole debate in itself which is
beyond the scope of this paper. It may be noted, however, that Keay has argued,
consistently with his views discussed above, that the limited protection which the duty
brings can be so justified.196
Conclusion
Although the directors'duty to the creditors of a financially distressed company is
now generally regarded as well established in principle in British law, there are still
important aspects of it which remain more or less unclear. These include issues such
as whether the duty is a direct or indirect duty, to which creditors the duty should be
owed, the extent to which creditors'interests are to be taken into account, whether the
test is subjective or objective, when the duty arises and whether the directors'
knowledge of when the duty arises is to be tested subjectively or objectively.
The Company Law Review Steering Group in 2001 was split on the question of
whether (a version of) the duty should be enacted in statute as part of a general
statement of directors' duties, but produced a draft of such a provision for
consideration which addressed many, if not all, of the present uncertainties
surrounding the duty. However, the government has decided not to proceed with such
a provision. Instead, the common law duty will be preserved and left to develop.
Arguably this is unsatisfactory, since the uncertainties surrounding the duty will
therefore remain and will have to be resolved by the courts if and when the
opportunity permits. An important opportunity to clarify this area of the law has
therefore been lost.
If the government rejected a statutory provision, was it right to retain nonetheless the
common law? It has been seen that notwithstanding the existence of a number of other
provisions aimed at protecting creditors'interests, there are gaps in these provisions
which the duty may be able to fill. Arguably, therefore, it does have an important role
to play in the modern law if the additional protection it can give creditors is seen to be
justified.
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